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The alternative law of alternative dispute resolution* 
Gordon R. WOODMAN** 
The perceptions afforded by the study of legal pluralism assist an 
understanding of the full scope and the social and moral significance of 
alternative dispute resolution. The latter term includes all modes and 
forms of dispute resolution within the legal order of the state other than 
the usual forms of adjudication by the ordinary courts. These modes may 
be classified in relatively wide and fluid categories as other forms of 
adjudication, and arbitration, mediation and negotiation. However, 
alternative dispute resolution also includes instances of all these 
processes which are not established, adopted, or made effective by the 
state. The study of legal pluralism throughout the world shows that 
almost everywhere are many such instances, generated within many 
semi-autonomous social fields other than the state, and falling into all the 
listed categories. 
The study of legal pluralism further suggests that the different 
dispute settlement processes are likely to be associated with different 
bodies of legal norms. There is evidence that to some extent alternative 
state processes employ different bodies of laws. The evidence also shows 
that non-state processes employ bodies of norms which always differ, and 
may differ widely from those of state law. While legal centralism denies 
these norms the name of "laws", there seems no good reason not to 
classify such rules and principles, which order relations within social 
fields other than the state, as "customary law", or by some similar term. 
Alternative dispure resolution processes have been lauded as 
enhancing the effectiveness of the law, providing wider access to justice 
or law. However, if the argument presented here is correct, it is not 
sufficient to represent them as implementing "the law". Rather each 
implements a different variety of law. The social functions of these 
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different laws of different dispute resolution processes, both state and 
non-state, vary, and so need investigation in each particular case. 
Whether any law is to be approved as affecting power relations in the 
society concerned is similarly a matter for investigation. While it has been 
suggested that alternative dispute resolution processes can confer on the 
weak and underprivileged an opportunity to assert their interests, it has 
been argued against such a view that they may provide opportunities for 
the already powerful to increase their powers, free of the restraining 
influence of regular state courts. On the other hand, state processes may 
at certain historical moments be manipulated by the weak to their 
advantage. Non-state processes may, also in special circumstances, 
empower collectively the members of the social fields in which they 
operate. 
La vision pluraliste du droit aide à bien comprendre la portée et la 
signification sociale et morale des modes alternatifs de solution des 
conflits, c'est-à-dire, par rapport à Vordre juridique étatique, des modes 
de solution autres que celui correspondant à l'intervention décisionnelle 
des tribunaux ordinaires. Ces modes peuvent se rattacher à une typologie 
souple qui inclut d'autres formes d'adjudication, l'arbitrage, la médiation 
et la négociation. Mais, on doit tout aussi bien comprendre d'autres voies 
établies et pratiquées sans le concours de l'Etat. L'étude du pluralisme 
juridique en tant que phénomène universel permet de constater l'exis-
tence quasi universelle de tels forums correspondant à plusieurs ordres 
sociaux semi-autonomes et non étatiques. 
L'étude du pluralisme juridique incite de plus à poser que les 
différents modes de solutions des conflits ont tendance à être associés à 
différents corpus de normes juridiques. On peut démontrer, pour ce qui 
est de l'ordre étatique, que, dans une certaine mesure, les modes 
alternatifs font appel à différents ensembles normatifs. Quant aux voies 
non étatiques, on peut également établir que les normes appliquées 
diffèrent, parfois même de façon marquée, du droit étatique. Bien qu'une 
conception centralisée du droit refuse de qualifier de 'jurisprudence" ces 
normes, aucune véritable raison ne permet de refuser de tenir ces règles 
et principes, qui régissent des ordres sociaux autre que l'État, pour du 
"droit coutumier", au sens général du terme. 
On a souvent reconnu aux modes alternatifs de solution des conflits 
l'avantage de promouvoir Veffectivité du droit, d'élargir l'accès à la 
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justice ou au droit. Cependant, si la présente thèse est correcte, il ne 
suffit plus de s'en tenir à cet apport relié à l'application du droit. En fait, 
chacun des modes alternatifs met en œuvre une espèce distincte de droit. 
Les fonctions sociales de ces différents droits correspondant à différents 
modes de solution de conflits, qu'ils soient ou non étatiques, varient; 
d'où la nécessité d'une approche spécifique. De même, doit-on étudier, 
dans toute société donnée, si une loi y porte atteinte aux rapports de 
pouvoirs. Si on a avancé l'idée que les modes alternatifs de solution des 
conflits offrent aux parties faibles et défavorisées l'occasion de faire 
valoir leurs intérêts, on a aussi soutenu, à l'inverse, qu'ils peuvent 
permettre à des justiciables déjà bien nantis, d'augmenter leurs pouvoirs, 
étant ainsi à l'abri de l'influence régulatrice des tribunaux étatiques. À 
certains moments de l'histoire, les démunis peuvent même manipuler à 
leur avantage l'intervention étatique. Les voies non étatiques peuvent 
également, en certaines circonstances particulières, favoriser collec-
tivement les membres de certains collectivités dans lesquelles elles 
interviennent. 
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The concept of Legal Pluralism is currently the subject of analysis of 
a number of students of legal theory. The social phenomenon of Legal 
Pluralism is the subject of empirical investigation by a many students of 
law and society in all parts of the world. Perspectives and conclusions 
differ, but many of those involved have found that the concept is a 
powerful aid to conceptual analysis, sociological understanding, and 
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evaluation in fields related to law'. This paper is an attempt to employ the 
concept to develop an understanding of the implications of alternative 
dispute resolution. 
1. What is the field of alternative dispute resolution ? 
1.1. Introductory issues 
No-one could by the light of nature understand the meaning of 
Alternative Dispute Resolution. The precise signification of each of the 
three words is problematic. Fortunately the literature illuminates some of 
these problems. It indicates that in some respects accepted conventions 
provide a reasonable degree of precision. For other aspects of the subject 
it clarifies the competing meanings between which one must choose if one 
would discuss the topic in theoretical terms, that is, generally. 
This paper debates certain general propositions about the topic. It is 
not intended to deny the usefulness of contributions which fasten on and 
develop specific issues within the fields. But it does assert as a premise 
the overriding importance of theory. It is based on the contention that, 
whenever any discussion of a specific issue is claimed to be a contribution 
to a particular field of knowledge, that claim presupposes a map, that is, a 
general theory of the field. 
The central term "dispute" has been treated by some as interchan-
geable with "conflict"2. Although for some sociological inquiries that 
may be helpful, it applies the term "dispute" to too broad a range of 
phenomena for the purpose of the present discussion. To keep the debate 
within reasonably narrow bounds, and to accord with established 
convention, it seems more helpful to adopt a more restrictive notion. 
Here a dispute will be seen as the species of conflict which has developed 
1. It is not possible to list here the considerable literature on Legal Pluralism. The 
following introduce certain aspects of the notion, and refer to a large quantity of 
literature: J. GRIFFITHS, "What is Legal Pluralism?", (1986) 24 Journal of Legal 
Pluralism and Unofficial Law I; S.E. MERRY. "Legal Pluralism", (1988) 22 Law 
& Society Rev. 869; M. CHIBA. Legal Pluralism: Toward a General Theory Through 
Japanese Legal Culture, Tokyo, Tokai University Press, 1989 ; G.R. WOODMAN, "Folk 
Law", in M. CHIBA (ed.), Supplement to A.-J. ARNAUD (gen. ed.), Dictionnaire 
d'Eguilles. Paris and Brussels, Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence and Story-
Scientia, forthcoming. 
2. See e.g. : V. AUBERT, "Competition and Dissensus : Two Types of Conflict and of 
Conflict Resolution", (1963) 7 J. of Conflict Resolution 26; T. ECKHOFF, "The 
Mediator, the Judge and the Administrator in Conflict-Resolution", (1967) 10 Acta 
Sociologies 148. 
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to the point where there is a public assertion of the mutually inconsistent 
claims and the fact of their incompatibility3. 
This definition is not limited to disputes over the appropriate 
remedies for alleged past acts, which are the commonest subject of 
litigation. It extends also to expressed conflicts over the appropriate 
terms of continuing future relations between the parties. These cannot be 
excluded, since the topic is generally agreed to include, for example, the 
resolution of labour disputes as to the future terms of work contracts4. 
Consequently the definition of "dispute" includes many instances of 
conflict over purely political or administrative matters. They will not 
require much discussion because the term "resolution", as it is to be 
defined, is not often applicable to the means used typically to deal with 
them5. 
The word "resolution" as used in the phrase is really intended to 
refer to processes or modes of resolution. It is used by some to refer to 
any mode at all of dealing with disputes, including for example exit, 
avoidance, tolerance and unprincipled coercion. These are, again, of 
interest for some sociological inquiries, but not, it is believed, for the 
present purpose. However, the literature also reveals a converse danger 
of defining "resolution" too narrowly. If taken to mean the final 
elimination of a dispute, it would be a rare occurrence. Even that 
apparently most definite of resolutions, the final decision of a court of 
law, does not necessarily terminate a dispute, and may constitute no more 
3. R.L. ABEL, "A Comparative Theory of Dispute Institutions in Society", (1973-74) 8 
Law & Soc. Rev. 217. See also : A.L. EPSTEIN, "Introduction", in A.L. EPSTEIN (ed.), 
Contention and Dispute : Aspects of Law and Social Control in Melanesia, Canberra, 
Australian National University Press, 1974, p. 1 ; D. COUNTS and D. COUNTS, "The 
Kaliai Lupunga: Disputing in the Public Forum", in A.L. EPSTEIN (ed.), id., p. 113 ; 
F.G. SNYDER, "Anthropology, Dispute Processes and Law: a Critical Introduction", 
(1981) 8 Brit. J. ofL. & Soc. 141 ; M. CAIN, and K. KULCSAR, "Thinking Disputes : An 
Essay on the Origins of the Dispute Industry", (1981-82) 16 Law & Soc. Rev. 374; 
P. FITZPATRICK, "The Political Economy of Dispute Settlement in Papua New 
Guinea", in C SUMNER (ed.), Crime, Justice and Underdevelopment, London, 
Heinemann, 1982, p. 228. 
4. This was insisted upon repeatedly by Fuller in his influential articles on dispute 
resolution. See : L.L. FULLER, "Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator", (1963) Wis. 
L. Rev. 3 ; Id., "Human Interaction and the Law", (1969) 14 Am. J. Juris. 1 ; Id., 
"Mediation — its Forms and Functions", (1971) 44 So. Calif. L. Rev. 305; Id., 
"The Forms and Limits of Adjudication", (1978) 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353; also 
M.A. EISENBERG, "Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement and 
Rulemaking", (1975-76) 89 Harv. L. Rev. 637. 
5. See further: L.L. FULLER, supra, note 4 (1971, 1978) ; T. ECKHOFF, supra, note 2. 
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than one further factor in an indefinitely continuing dispute6. Other modes 
of dispute resolution, such as mediation or negotiation have been found to 
be at least equally likely to result in a "settlement" which constitutes no 
more than a staging point in a continued process of disputing7. Therefore a 
resolution is best viewed as an event which terminates a particular stage 
in the dispute by changing the normative relationship between the parties 
to a greater or lesser degree, but which does not necessarily terminate the 
dispute. 
Thus far the formula Alternative Dispute Resolution appears less 
than entirely satisfactory. But the qualifier "alternative" is yet more 
unsatisfactory than the other constituent elements. Grammatically it is 
inappropriately placed, because apparently it is intended to qualify not 
"dispute", but "resolution". Categorically it is ill-chosen because it is a 
contradiction in terms to speak of a singular alternative. When people use 
the adjective in this manner they usually mean "something which could 
stand in place ofthat which I have in mind at the moment". In such cases 
the "alternative" is the Beauvoirean second, "the other". Thus an 
alternative mode of dispute resolution means a mode which could be used 
instead of the standard. The implied notion that there is an intrinsically 
basic, standard mode is commonly related to a politically useful fallacy : 
that that with which the powerful are personally associated is the natural, 
standard instance. The notion may be inspired by ethnocentrism, 
religious faith, some other superstition, or simple egotism. In truth, 
standard cases are never intrinsically, only conventionally so. 
6. Thus it is shown how adjudication may be merely the basis for further bargaining 
between the still disputing parties, in G. CALABRESI and A.D. MELAMED, "Property 
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability —One View of the Cathedral", (1972) 85 
Harv. L. Rev. 1089. The importance of post-adjudication disputing, and especially 
negotiation, is shown in: K. von BENDA-BECKMANN, The Broken Stairways to 
Consensus : Village Justice and State Courts in Minangkabau, Dordecht-Holland and 
Cinnaminson-U.S.A., Foris Publications, 1984; Id., "The Social Significance of 
Minangkabau State Court Decisions", (1984) 23 Journal of Legal Pluralism and 
Unofficial Law 1. Adjudication by a court is seen as rarely terminating disputes, but as a 
sanction which one party may use against another in a continuing dispute, by S.E. 
MERRY, "Going to Court: Strategies of Dispute Management in an American Urban 
Neighbourhood", (1979) 13 Law & Soc. Rev. 891. 
7. P.H. GULLIVER, Social Control in an African Society, London, Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1963; Id., "Introduction: Case Studies of Law in Non-Western Societies", 
in L. NADER (ed.), Law in Culture and Society, 1969, p. 11, at p. 14-15 ; R.L. ABEL, 
supra, note 3, p. 228; M. SALTMAN, The Kipsigis : a Case Study in Changing 
Customary Law, Cambridge Mass., Schenkman, 1977, p. 46-49 ; C S . MESCHIEVITZ and 
M. GALANTER, "In Search of Nyaya Panchayats: The Politics of a Moribund 
Institution", in R.L. ABEL (ed.), The Politics of Informal Justice, New York, London, 
Academic Press, 1982, Vol. 2: "Comparative Studies", p. 47. 
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We can in the present case only adopt the convention, while 
attempting to escape from its evaluative undertones. The convention 
seems to be that alternative dispute resolution consists of the modes of 
dispute resolution which are alternatives to adjudication in the longest-
established, traditional courts of the state according to their usual 
procedures (hereafter adjudication by state courts). That this latter is seen 
as the standard is not surprising in view of the fact that the bulk of the 
literature has been written by legal practioners and others whose business 
it is to operate, study or teach about the work of these institutions8. It is 
worth emphasising by an example the element of ethnocentrism in the 
convention. Among the Arusha of Tanzania modes of dispute resolution 
existed before the advent of colonial rule and the inception of the modern 
state. Those processes, as they continued vigorously in the colonial 
period, are examined in the influential work of Gulliver. Referring to the 
advent of colonial rule, and the establishment of state courts, he is led by 
the historical sequence to sum up the development by saying that 
"adjudication by government magistrates became an alternative method 
of dispute-settlement"9. 
The adjective "alternative" also carries the association of a choice 
between the objects on offer. However, disputes involve two parties at 
least, who do not usually, at the initial stages, find it easy to agree about 
very much. There is no particular reason why the choice between 
alternatives should be made by one party rather than the other, or should 
not be made by some third party with authority over them, or by the 
community to which they belong. There are many examples of different 
possibilities. The mode of choice is, therefore, a variable. It has been 
included as such in studies of the ways in which disputing parties may 
manoeuvre for procedural advantage10. 
8. See also M. CAIN and K. KULCSAR, supra, note 3, p. 378-83. 
9. P.H. GULLIVER, supra, note 7 (1963), p. 273-74. His perspective was noted by 
M.A. EISENBERG, supra, note 4, p. 640. See similarly: P. FITZPATRICK, supra, note 3, 
p. 246, 247; S.E. MERRY, "Anthropology and the Study of Alternative Dispute 
Resolution", (1984) 34 J. Legal Educ. 277. 
10. See e.g. : L. NADER, "The Anthropological Study of Law", (1965) 67 (6) American 
Anthropologist 3, p. 23 ; M.J. LOWRY, "Me ko Court : The Impact of Urbanization on 
Conflict Resolution in a Ghanaian Town", in G. FOSTER and R. KEMPER (eds.), 
Anthropologists in Cities, 1974, p. 153, at p. 173-76; F.G. SNYDER, supra, note 3, 
p. 145; K. von BENDA-BECKMANN, supra, note 6, Chap. I l l ; J. GRIFFITHS, "Four 
Laws of Interaction in Circumstances of Legal Pluralism : First Steps Towards an 
Explanatory Theory", in A. ALLOTT and G.R. WOODMAN (eds.), People's Law and 
State Law: the Bellagio Papers, Dordrecht-Holland and Cinnaminson-U.S.A., Foris 
Publications, 1985, p. 217 ; F. von BENDA-BECKMANN, "Some Comparative Generali-
zations About the Differential Use of State and Folk Institutions of Dispute 
Settlement", in A. ALLOTT and G.R. WOODMAN (eds.), p. 187. These writings all show 
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A term frequently met in recent literature, and sometimes used 
interchangeably with alternative dispute resolution, is « informal justice ». 
It is defined in the literature on that subject11. It coincides with alternative 
dispute resolution frequently, but not in every instance. Consequently 
much, but not all of the literature on informal justice is relevant to the 
present discussion. Some will be referred to below. 
The argument of these opening paragraphs has been pedantic. But 
they constitute the first step in opening the view on a field which is larger 
than it may seem at first sight. It follows from them that, to examine 
modes of dispute resolution which are alternatives to adjudication by 
state courts we must consider : modes alternative to adjudication ; and 
modes alternative to those of the state. 
1.2. Alternative modes of dispute resolution 
Alternatives to the standard case are sometimes provided by 
alternative forms of adjudication. These may take the form of special 
adjudicative procedures in the ordinary courts, of adjudication in special 
sections of those courts, or of adjudication in special courts within the 
state judicial system. Many small claims procedures and courts are 
examples12. These modes of dispute resolution are alternatively only to a 
limited degree, being not much more than duplicates. All are instances of 
adjudication in the state judicial system. 
In adjudication a decision on how the dispute is to be resolved is 
reached by a third party, the judge. The judge's authority to decide is 
derived from the holding of an office, which confers authority over both 
of the disputants for the purpose of the dispute. The judge reaches or 
purports to reach the decision by applying pre-existing rules. The decision 
can normally be enforced by official coercion13. 
The state may provide alternative dispute resolution processes not 
only by setting up new institutions of adjudication, but also by providing 
for modes of dispute resolution other than adjudication. Students of law, 
anthropology and sociology have identified a number of other modes of 
dispute resolution. All are represented in the legal systems of modern 
also that the freedom of either party to choose between the alternatives may be limited 
in various ways. On this see also M. SALTMAN, supra, note 7, p. 57. 
11. E.g. in R.L. ABEL, "Introduction", in R.L. ABEL (ed.), supra, note 7, Vol. 1 : "The 
American Experience", p. 1, at p. 2. 
12. Another is referred to in C S . MESCHIEVITZ and M. GALANTER, supra, note 7. See also 
the discussion of Papua New Guinea Village Courts infra. 
13. On adjudication, see further L.L. FULLER, supra, note 4 (1978). 
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states. There is not complete agreement among students, but most would 
agree that is it reasonable to categorise them as arbitration, mediation and 
negotiation. In practice each of these modes occurs in a variety of forms, 
some of which are hardly distinguishable from similar forms of other 
modes14. 
Arbitration differs essentially from adjudication only in that the third 
party's authority is derived from a specific agreement for that purpose 
between the parties. State courts in England were long hesitant to grant 
legal recognition to agreements to arbitrate or to arbitrators' decisionsL\ 
Today examples are common in relation to disputes over commercial 
transactions and labour relations16. The form of the process varies17, and 
in some instances the procedures of arbitration are indistinguishable from 
those of other modes of dispute resolution. At one extreme are 
arbitrations which are identical with the processes of the standard type of 
adjudication, in which facts are determined according to evidence 
formally adduced, and rules are applied to the facts as found. At the other 
extreme are processes where the concern of the arbitrator (and this 
applies also to judges in some cases) to achieve a resolution acceptable to 
both sides leads him or her to act in ways which are not greatly different 
14. The discussion of the categorisation of forms of dispute resolution has been voluminous. 
The present writer finds the following particularly useful : V. AUBERT. supra, note 2 : 
Id., "Law as a Way of Resolving Conflicts : the Case of a Small Industrialized Society", 
in L. NADER, supra, note 7, p. 282: A.L. EPSTEIN, supra, note 3, p. 19-25: 
D. COUNTS and D. COUNTS, supra, note 3. p. 123-24; G. BIERBRAUER, J. FALKE and 
K.-F. KOCH, "Conflict and its Settlement: An Interdisciplinary Study Concerning the 
Legal Basis, Function and Performance of the Institution of the Schiedsmann", in 
M. CAPPELLETTI (Gen. Ed.). Access to Justice, Alphenaandenrijn and Milan, Sijthoff 
and Giuffré, 1978-79, Vol. II, Book I, p. 39, at p. 51-56; S. ROBERTS, Order and 
Dispute: An Introduction to Legal Anthropology, Penguin Books. Harmondsworth, 
1979, p. 69-78, 162-67 ; E. JOHNSON, "Thinking About Access : A Preliminary Typology 
of Possible Strategies", in M. CAPPELLETTI, supra. Vol. Ill, p. 3 ; K.-F. KOCH, 
"Access to Justice: An Anthropological Perspective", in M. CAPPELLETTI, supra. 
Vol. IV, p. 1 ; E.D. GREEN, "A Comprehensive Approach to the Theory and Practice of 
Dispute Resolution", (1984) 34 J. Legal Educ. 245. 
15. G.L. WILLIAMS, "The Doctrine of Repugnancy — II: in the Law of Arbitration", (1944) 
60 Law Q. Rev. 69. 
16. For English developments in another area, see R. THOMAS, "Alternative Dispute 
Resolution — Consumer Disputes", (1988) Civ. Just. Q. 206. 
17. For an indication of the varieties possible, see R. WILLIAMS, "Should the State Provide 
Alternative Dispute Resolution Services", (1987) Civ. Just. Q. 142. 
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from mediation, although there is controversy as to whether the two roles 
can be effectively exercised by the same person18. 
Mediation entails activity by a third party who is not a judge or any 
type of umpire, is not acting in pursuance of authority to impose a 
decision, and can only propose to the parties the terms of possible 
agreements by which they might resolve the dispute. The process is 
sometimes called conciliation, and is exemplified in the field of labour 
relations in the more publicised function of the British Arbitration and 
Conciliation Service19. The third party may be a collectivity, although this 
is unlikely to be the case with state mediation. The clearest instances are 
those described, for non-state mediation, by anthropologists, where the 
entire adult community meets to debate a dispute with a view to 
persuading the disputants to agree to a settlement20. This mode also 
varies. The third party may take a proactive role, and have a degree of 
authority which makes it difficult for the disputants to reject the terms of a 
settlement which he or she proposes. Mediation in such a case 
approaches arbitration or adjudication, as mentioned in the previous 
paragraph. At the other extreme, and especially where the mediator is a 
collectivity, its members may be almost indistinguishable from agents of 
the respective parties, and so it may verge on negotiation21. 
Negotiation (or bargaining22) consists of any process directed 
towards an agreed resolution in which no third party plays a significant 
part. The disputing parties are commonly both subject to some economic 
or social pressure to reach an agreement, and hence to constraints on the 
degree to which they can refuse terms to settle. These constraints are 
18. See : L.L. FULLER, supra, note 4 (1963) ; P.H. GULLIVER, supra, note 7 (1969), p. 22 ; 
B. YNGVESSON and M. HENNESSEY, "Small Claims, Complex Disputes: a Review of 
the Small Claims Literature", (1965) 9 Law & Soc. Rev. 219 ; A. SARAT, "Alternatives 
in Dispute Processing: Litigation in a Small Claims Court", (1975-76) 10 Law & Soc. 
Rev. 339; M. CAPPELLETTI and B. GARTH, "Access to Justice: The Worldwide 
Movement to Make Rights Effective. A General Report", in M. CAPPELLETTI, supra, 
note 14, Vol. I, Book 1, p. 3, at p. 59 ; K.F. RÖHL, "The Judge as Mediator", (1985) 
4 Civ. Just. Q. 235. 
19. See also: R. THOMAS, supra, note 16; R. YOUNG, "Neighbour Dispute Mediation: 
Theory and Practice", (1989) 8 Civ. Just. Q. 319. 
20. E.g. GULLIVER, supra, note 7 (1963). 
21. T. ECKHOFF, supra, note 2 ; L.L. FULLER, supra, note 4 (1971); M. SALTMAN, 
"Indigenous Law Among the Ksipigis of Southwestern Kenya", in M. CAPPELLETTI, 
supra, note 14, Vol. Ill, p. 311 ; S.E. MERRY, "The Social Organization of Mediation in 
Nonindustrial Societies : Implications for Informal Community Justice in America", in 
R.L. ABEL, supra, note 7 (1982), Vol. 2, p. 17. 
22. E.H. NORTON, "Bargaining and the Ethic of Process", (1989) 64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 493, 
p. 494 n. 1, and generally. 
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frequently set by the terms which would be imposed if the dispute were 
taken to adjudication23. The parties may be institutions, or groups of 
individuals. Especially in these cases, but also when they are single 
individuals, they may act through agents. This process frequently 
precedes the commencement of any of the other processes, and its 
outcome may postpone or obviate recourse to them24. 
In consequence of the definition of "dispute" which has been 
adopted, the notion of negotiation has a wide range. It extends to many of 
the disputes over political and administrative decision-making which 
could not feasibly be subjected to adjudication, or even in many cases 
mediation. It could be illuminating to compare negotiations on such 
matters with those involving issues which could feasibly go to mediation, 
or even to adjudication. However, the present discussion is concerned 
with comparisons between different dispute resolution processes. For this 
purpose it will suffice to focus on negotiations over matters which could 
be the subject of the other forms of processes25. 
Conciliation need not be considered as a separate category. It is some 
sometimes a form of mediation, sometimes a form of therapy26. In the 
latter case the objects of the conciliator's intervention are usually 
disputing parties engaged in negotiation, and the aim is to influence their 
conduct of the negotiation. 
All these forms of dispute resolution "by talking" are contrasted by 
some with the further alternative of dispute resolution "by fighting" or 
coercion27. However, even if these can be reasonably included in the 
category of dispute resolution, the research currently available on them, 
while of sociological interest and practical value, supports the conclusion 
that relatively little is to be learnt about the other processes by 
comparison with them. 
23. M. CAPPELLETTI and B. GARTH, supra, note 18, p. 64-66; R.H. MNOOKIN and 
L. KORNHAUSER, "Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law : the Case of Divorce", (1979) 
88 Yale L.J. 950. 
24. T. ECKHOFF, supra, note 2. 
25. Cf. T. ECKHOFF, supra, note 2, p. 166-69. See generally P.H. GULLIVER, "Negotiations 
as a Mode of Dispute Settlement : Towards a General Model", (1972-73) 7 Law & Soc. 
Rev. 667. 
26. M. CAPPELLETTI and B. GARTH, supra, note 18, p. 61-63 ; A. OGUS et ai, "Evaluating 
Alternative Dispute Resolution : Measuring the Impact of Family Conciliation on 
Costs", (1990) 53 Mod. L. Rev. 57 ; S. ROBERTS, "A blue-print for family conciliation ?" 
(1990) 53 Mod. L. Rev. 88. 
27. Terminology from S. ROBERTS, supra, note 14, Chap. 9; cf. P. FITZPATRICK, supra, 
note 3, p. 233. 
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Any of these methods may be applied to a dispute which could 
otherwise be resolved by adjudication by state courts (although they may 
also be applied to disputes which could not). Thus a legislator or other 
policy-maker who thinks it necessary to introduce a substitute for 
adjudication by state courts may resort to any of them. Consequently, the 
reforming legislator should, if the work of reform is to be comprehen-
sively conducted, consider the possibility of resorting to each. 
There may be a far more complex relationship between these modes 
than the either-or choice pattern. One dispute may include a large number 
of distinguishable issues. The various issues may be resolved by different 
modes. Thus during the course of litigation directed to resolution by 
adjudication, various issues may be settled by agreement between 
counsel on their own initiative (negotiation through agents), or at the 
suggestion of and on terms suggested by the judge (mediation) ; these may 
occur before any adjudication has occurred, or when some major issues 
have been adjudicated but others not, or after all the principal issues have 
been adjudicated. 
1.3. Dispute resolution by non-state processes 
The examples given in the previous section were predominantly 
processes of dispute resolution established, controlled or enforced by 
state institutions. In this subsection it will be argued that all these modes 
can and frequently do also exist independently of the state. 
For the purpose of this discussion it is perhaps not essential to argue 
for a particular definition of law. The category of alternative dispute 
resolution is neither expressly nor impliedly restricted to processes 
involving the application of "law"28 . Nevertheless, the argument to be 
developed below will have more general implications if it is coupled with a 
particular argument as to the use of the word "law". It is contended that 
the word may be properly used to refer to all socially accepted norms, and 
need not be limited to those observed and enforced by the state. From this 
it follows that it is as appropriate to use the term "law" of the norms 
applied in non-state dispute resolution processes as it is to refer to the 
norms applied in state processes as "law". 
The argument for this contention starts from an observation. There 
exist everywhere bodies of observed social norms other than the laws of 
the state. These are generated and operate in semi-autonomous social 
28. Cf. the arguments in : R.L. ABEL, supra, note 3, 221-24 ; F.G. SNYDER, supra, note 3, 
p. 145. 
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fields which rarely coincide with the international boundaries of the 
state. Such norms frequently structure the social relations of those in their 
fields to a far greater extent than the laws of the states which claim their 
allegiance. These customary laws (to use one among a plethora of 
alternative labels30) include the social norms of minority ethnic groups, 
both indigenous (such as in Australia and the Americas) and immigrant 
(virtually everywhere), and also of ethnic groups which comprise the 
totalities of populations (such as in most of Africa and much of Asia). 
They also include the self-generated social norms of groups everywhere 
who are united not by ethnicity but other features such as the pursuit of a 
particular occupation, or residence in a particular locality. 
It is contended that there is no justification for the ideology of legal 
centralism31 which sees a significant difference between state law and 
customary law. The two types of law share the same characteristics and 
are divisible into the same categories, with norms of obligation, sanctions, 
various types of secondary rules32, principles33 and, as will be argued, the 
various forms of dispute resolution processes. State laws and customary 
laws merge into each other in fields such as those of constitutional 
conventions, the customary practices of commerce and trade, and the 
norms of positive morality which state judges feel themselves bound to 
take into account when developing state law34. Nevertheless it has to be 
29. This helpful term was coined in the paper which eventually became Chap. 2 in 
S.F. MOORE, Law as Process: an Anthropological Approach, London, Routledge 
& Kegan Paul, 1978. 
30. Those terms known to me are listed G.R. WOODMAN, supra, note 1. 
31. J. GRIFFITHS, supra, note 1. 
32. Following the analysis of H.L.A. HART, The Concept of Law, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1961. 
33. Following R. DWORKIN, Taking Rights Seriously, Cambridge Mass, Harvard, U.P., 
1977. 
34. See : E. EHRLICH, Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law (trans. W.L. Moll), 
Cambridge Mass, Harvard, U.P.,1936; E.A. HOEBEL, The Law of Primitive Man: 
a Study in Comparative Legal Dynamics, Cambridge Mass., Harvard U.P., 1954; 
L.L. FULLER, supra, note 4 (1969) ; J.F. HOLLEMAN, "Trouble-Cases and Trouble-less 
Cases in the Study of Customary Law and Legal Reform", (1972-73) 7 Law & Soc. Rev. 
585; B. de SOUSA SANTOS, "The Law of the Oppressed: The Construction and 
Reproduction of Legality in Pasargada", (1977) 12 Law & Society Rev. 5 ; S.F. MOORE, 
supra, note 29; C.P. DREDGE, "Dispute Settlement in the Mormon Community: The 
Operation of Ecclesiastical Courts in Utah", in M. CAPPELLETTI, supra, note 14, 
Vol. IV, p. 191 ; M. GALANTER, "Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, 
and Indigenous Law", (1981) 19 Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 1 ; 
E. L E ROY and M. WANE, "La formation des droits non étatiques", in Encyclopé-
die Juridique de l'Afrique, vol. 1, "L'État et le Droit", Dakar, 1982, p. 353; 
H.W. ARTHURS, 'Without the Law' : Administrative Justice and Legal Pluralism in 
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observed that the ideology of legal centralism is widely accepted among 
students of law, and much discussion of alternative dispute resolution, 
such as the Florence Access-to-Justice Project, have been based on its 
assumptions35. 
The categories of state and non-state dispute resolution processes 
might be distinguished according to whether the state originally estab-
lished them, the state currently provided logistic support, the state 
enforced their resolutions, or they applied state norms. Many instances 
would be differently classified according to the criteria used, and some 
Nineteenth-Century England, Toronto, London, U. of Toronto Press, 1985 ; A. ALLOTT 
and G.R. WOODMAN, supra, note 10; F. STRIJBOSCH, "The Concept of Pela and its 
Social Significance in the Community of Moluccan Immigrants in the Netherlands", 
(1985) 23 Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 177; K. von BENDA-
BECKMANN and F. STRIJBOSCH (eds.), Anthropology of Law in the Netherlands : Essays 
in Legal Pluralism, Dordrecht, Foris Publications, 1985; M. CHIBA (ed.), Asian 
Indigenous Law : In Interaction with Received Law, London and New York, KPI, 1986 ; 
Id., supra, note 1 ; J. GRIFFITHS, supra, note 1 ; P. SACK and E. MINCHIN (eds.), Legal 
Pluralism : Proceedings of the Canberra Law Workshop VII, Canberra, Australian 
National University, 1986; MERRY, supra, note 1; B.W. MORSE and G.R. WOOD-
MAN (eds.). Indigenous Law and the State, Dordrecht, Foris Publications, 1988; 
G.R. WOODMAN, "What is the Commission About?", (1988-89) XIV-XVII Newsletter 
of the Commission on Folk Law and Legal Pluralism, International Union of 
Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences. An important recent discussion of non-state 
dispute resolution processes in western societies is M. GALANTER, supra, which 
provides support for many of the contentions in the present paper. A neat example of 
legal centralism in respect of dispute resolution is the statement : "The administration of 
justice is perhaps the oldest of the state monopolies", R. THOMAS, "A Code of 
Procedure for Small Claims : a Response to the Demand for Do-it-yourself Litigation", 
(1982) 1 Civ. Just. Q. 52, p. 52. 
An explanation is due for the omission of any mention of international law in this paper. 
I believe that the example of international law — manifestly not a state law (although its 
substance may be adopted as state law in some jurisdictions), but universally referred to 
as a law — could be used to illustrate virtually every observation suggested here. 
However, it is the subject of a distinctive field of doctrine and practice. A great deal of 
explanation and justificatory argument would be needed to employ it as an example. For 
economy of space, therefore, this illustration is not used. 
35. M. CAPPELLETTI, supra, note 14, especially the questionnaire, Vol. I, Book 1, p. 125. 
Cf. L.M. FRIEDMAN, "Access to Justice: Social and Historical Context", in 
M. CAPPELLETTI, id., Vol. II, Book 1, p. 3, at p. 8, showing that the notion is a relatively 
modern development. A work strongly marked with a legal centralist orientation is 
J.S. AUERBACH, Justice Without Law?, New York, Oxford, Oxford U.P., 1983. That 
work considers non-state dispute resolution processes not to be "legal". Cf. S. HENRY, 
Private Justice : Towards Integrated Theorising in the Sociology of Law, London, 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983, the basis of which study implicitly rejects legal 
centralism; L.K. WROTH, "Pluralism and Uniformity in the Common Law Legal 
Tradition", (1988) 37 U.N.B.L. L.J. 76, especially at p. 82-84, adopting an analysis of 
alternative dispute resolution similar to that offered here. 
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could not be classified unequivocally even if a single criterion were used. 
In the following discussion those dispute resolution processes will be 
classified as non-state processes which are not structured primarily by the 
state. These are processes which are neither established nor adopted by 
the state, and the resolutions of which are not systematically enforced by 
the state. The types of norms applied in such processes are the variable 
discussed in this paper. 
The remainder of this section will note the existence in non-state 
fields of the various modes of dispute resolution already listed. 
Non-state adjudication occurs when customary law confers on an 
office-holder authority to determine disputes by the application of 
established norms. This is not unusual. "The decision of the Secretary [or 
Chairman, or Registrar, or Headmaster, or Management Committee] shall 
be final" is a common provision in the rules of private institutions. Where 
the decision is to be determined at least in part by rules or principles, and 
where the institution itself has some means of enforcement (whether or 
not the state courts would in fact also enforce the decision if called upon), 
non-state adjudication exists36. That the designated official may misinter-
pret or blatantly disregard the rules or principles which are required to be 
applied, or that the means of enforcement are feeble and ineffective, are 
immaterial at this point : the conduct of state judges and courts sometimes 
display the same features. If they occur beyond à certain extent in either a 
state or a non-state system of adjudication the result is liable to be the 
demise of that system. But either type of system can survive a great deal 
of abuse and feebleness. 
Arbitration which is independent of the state occurs when the 
agreement to confer power on a third party is effective under a customary 
law, rather than state law. This generally occurs in a different type of 
context from that in which there is recourse to adjudication. A general 
provision for dispute resolution by resort to arbitration is likely to be a 
major part of the laws of the institution, which may even have been 
established primarily for this purpose. In the case of adjudication the 
36. See for examples e.g.: ANONYMOUS, "Rabbinical Courts: Modern Day Solomons", 
(1970) 6 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 49; H.J. KIRSCH, "Conflict Resolution and the 
Legal Culture: a Study of the Rabbinical Court", (1971) 9 Osgoode Hall L.J. 335 ; 
M.J. LOWRY, supra, note 10; B. de SOUSA SANTOS, supra, note 34; E. COMBS-
SCHILLING, "Grieving and Feuding : The Organizational Dilemma of a Labour Union", 
in L. NADER (ed.), No Access to Law : Alternatives to the American Judicial Sys-
tem, New York, London, Academic Press, 1980, p. 461 ; CS. MESCHIEVITZ and 
M. GALANTER, supra, note 7 ; S. HENRY, supra, note 35 ; U. BAXI, "Popular Justice, 
Participatory Development and Power Politics: The Lok Adalat in Turmoil", in 
A. ALLOTT and G.R. WOODMAN, supra, note 10, p. 171. 
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reference to the "final decision" of the official is often a relatively 
insignifiant part of the institutional rules. Trade, labour and professional 
associations are likely to provide for arbitration of disputes between 
members, providing that disputing members may agree on the person to 
act as arbitrator, and are to accept the decision given37. 
Mediation which is independent of the state has been scientifically 
studied in detail in non-western societies, but is found everywhere. 
Where the notion of a strict application of rules to resolve all disputes is 
regarded with disfavour, there is an expectation that disputants will seek 
to resolve their differences by compromise. The assistance of a third 
party may be vital in securing a resolution which both can be induced to 
accept . 
Non-state negotiation is to be found, for example, when a dispute 
between two members of a family or an informal voluntary association is 
resolved by negotiation which employs no state institution or official, and 
terminates in a resolution which is binding under a customary law rather 
than state law39. 
1.4. Conclusion 
It has been argued that the area of alternative dispute resolution may 
be usefully seen as larger than it is sometimes assumed to be. There are 
two dimensions of variation. First, dispute resolution may occur within 
the field of activity of the state, or within any other semi-autonomous 
social field. Because the fields of jurisdiction are semi-autonomous, a 
particular resolution within one field may have effects in other, 
overlapping fields. Secondly, a process of dispute resolution may consist 
of adjudication, arbitration, mediation or negotiation, or include elements 
of two or more of these. Any study of an aspect of existing dispute 
resolution processes should take account of existing alternatives. Any 
analysis of an existing situation, and any proposal for future action, 
37. An example is given in the account of M. EASTON, "The Better Business Bureau: 'The 
Voice of the People in the Marketplace' " in L. NADER, supra, note 36, p. 223. 
38. See e.g.: P.H. GULLIVER, supra, note 7; ANONYMOUS, supra, note 36; H.J. KIRSCH, 
supra, note 36 ; L.-W. Doo, "Dispute Settlement in Chinese-American Communities", 
(1973) 21 Am. J. Comp. L. 627; A.L. EPSTEIN (ed.), supra, note 3 ; L. NADER and 
C. SHUGART, "Old Solutions for Old Problems", in L. NADER, supra, note 36, p. 57, at 
p. 74-78 ; D.R.C. CHALMERS, "A History of the Role of Traditional Dispute Settlement 
Procedures in the Courts of Papua New Guinea", in D. WEISBROT, A. PALIWALA and 
A. SAWYERR (eds.), Law and Social Change in Papua New Guinea, Sydney, 
Butterworths, 1982, p. 169. 
39. For examples, see A.L. EPSTEIN (ed.), supra, note 3. 
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concerned with a particular aspect of dispute resolution should at an 
initial stage take account of the possibilities for comparison (in analysis) 
and choice by policy-makers (in proposals for the future) offered by the 
dimensions of variation in this area. 
2. The legal norms of dispute resolution systems 
2.1. The relation of laws to dispute resolution : the general issue 
The conclusions reached thus far are relevant to the study of dispute 
resolution processes. They have not been shown to be directly relevant to 
the study of law. 
One possible justification for holding that the study of dispute 
resolution processes is a legal study must be disavowed. It has been quite 
widely asserted in the common-law world that law is no more than the 
activities of courts. The realists have claimed that the law consists of 
"prophecies of what the courts will do in fact"40, or "what officials do 
about disputes"41. According to that view, legal study is nothing other 
than the study of dispute resolution processes, or some of them. The 
profound error in the view was adequately summed up long ago by 
Kantorowicz : "One cannot define... courts of law without law. The law 
is not what the courts administer but the courts are the institutions which 
administer the law"42. It is not denied that many students of legal theory 
have found the realist view practically helpful for certain specific 
inquiries43. But in the present instance it would foreclose the further 
inquiry which it is intended to pursue. For this purpose is it preferable to 
follow a much older and more generally accepted view of law as 
consisting of norms, or rules and principles. 
The issue is the nature of the relationship between legal norms and 
the various processes of dispute resolution. Through an inquiry into this 
issue the notion of alternative dispute resolution may be used to throw 
40. O.W. HOLMES, "The Path of the Law", (1986-87) 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, p. 461. 
41. K.N. LLEWELLYN, The Bramble Bush (2nd ed.), New York, Oceana, 1951, p. 9. 
42. H. KANTOROWICZ, "Some Rationalism About Realism", (1934) 43 Yale L.J. 1240, 
p. 1250. See also especially: J.F. HOLLEMAN, supra, note 34; M. GLUCKMAN, 
"Limitations of the Case-Method in the Study of Tribal Law", (1972-73) 7 Law & Soc. 
Rev. 611 ; R. DWORKIN, supra, note 33. See J.S. AUERBACH, supra, note 35, a work 
which contains some interesting accounts of and comments on alternative dispute 
resolution processes, but is perhaps limited in its usefulness because it is uninterested in 
the norms affecting them ; and see also the comment on the work, supra, note 35. 
43. As the present writer did in G.R. WOODMAN, "Some Realism About Customary 
Law —The West African Experience", (1969) Wis. L. Rev. 128. 
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light on the nature and variety of law. The central thesis of this section is 
that there is a definite, although not easily analysed relationship between 
the content of a body of norms and the form of dispute resolution process 
in which they are applied. 
For the purpose of this argument it is necessary to question further 
the ideology of state law. The ideology asserts that (i) the law of every 
state is a self-consistent system with a single source of authority, and (ii) 
this state law is the only law properly so called. From these there follow 
two further propositions : (i) that all those dispute resolution processes in 
a state which are established or recognized by state law apply the same 
law ; (ii) that any processes which are not related to state law are at best 
non-legal (i.e., have no significant relation to and are unrecognised by any 
law), and at worst are illegal. 
In considering the role of norms in dispute resolution, state processes 
will be discussed first. 
2.2. The variety of state laws 
The traditional account of adjudication by state courts states that the 
process consists exclusively of the "application" of legal norms to 
particular situations, or could and ought to consist exclusively of this. 
Although that view is generally rejected today, on the ground that judges 
commonly have a certain degree of discretion, it is widely agreed that 
norms are of predominant importance in the resolution of disputes by 
adjudication. 
Given this view of adjudication, alternative modes of dispute 
resolution established by the state are sometimes sought to be justified as 
"making rights effective", i.e. giving fuller effect to people's rights under 
state law than would adjudication by the regular state courts44. This claim 
assumes that the same substantive norms will be applied in the state's 
alternative processes as in adjudication. In practice it seems to be 
conceded that some changes in substantive rights are always likely to 
occur45. In some instances it seems clear that distinctly different norms 
arise in different fora of adjudication46. 
The clearest instances of special state courts which apply different 
laws from those applied in the principal courts have been where the state 
44. E.g.: M. CAPPELLETTI and B. GARTH, supra note 18; B. GARTH, "The Movement 
Towards Procedural Informalism in North America and Western Europe : A Critical 
Survey", in ABEL (ed.), supra, note 7, Vol. 2, p. 183, at p. 190-91. 
45. M. CAPPELLETTI and B. GARTH, supra, note 18, p. 83-84. 
46. E.g. H.W. ARTHURS, supra, note 34, p. 138-162. 
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has "recognised" and incorporated into its own judicial system institu-
tions which has previously operated independently of the state. The 
British colonial policy of indirect rule resulted in the "recognition" thus 
of many existing "native courts". Those courts continued to apply some 
of the same norms as previously, although these had been norms of a 
customary law which were very different from the principal state law. 
Some of the most important studies by legal anthropologists of customary 
laws have been studies of such courts47. 
Another demonstration is provided by the Papua New Guinea Village 
Courts Act 1973. This statute implements a policy according to which the 
state is to establish local courts which will follow local customary 
procedures and practices, and not the procedural or substantive laws of 
the common law which are followed in all other state courts. The Act 
provides for the establishment of Village Courts, rather than the 
recognition of existing courts. But it provides that these creations of the 
state are to seek to secure "just and amicable settlements". To this end 
they are not to be bound by any laws other than the Constitution and the 
Village Courts Acts. Thus they are not to be bound by the procedural or 
substantive norms of the common law or statute, and are rather to decide 
cases "in accordance with substantial justice"48. Here, as in the cases of 
native courts, is an express acknowledgement in state law that certain 
state courts may not apply the same laws as the regular state courts. 
When arbitration is provided for by state law, the arbitrators can be 
required to apply exactly the same norms as judges. But there is no 
necessity either in theory or in policy for this, and in practice it is not 
always a requirement. The arbitrator is normally selected for the 
possession of expert knowledge relevant to the matter in dispute. It is 
expected that the arbitrator will make use of this knowledge, whereas a 
judge would have to be informed through the court's formal methods of 
proof. It may be appropriate for an arbitrator to adopt a different 
approach from that of a judge in deciding issues of law. The arbitrator's 
approach may be less formal, or on other occasions more formal49, but in 
either event is different and so may give rise to different decisions. 
Research suggests that some categories of arbitrators act predictably, 
according to known norms ; but that the norms may be not those of state 
courts' case-law. They may, for example, be those of commercial 
47. M. GLUCKMAN, The Judicial Process Among the Barotse of Northern Rhodesia, 
Manchester, Manchester U.P., 1955 ; P. BOHANNAN, Justice and Judgment Among the 
Tiv, London, New York, Toronto, Oxford, U.P., 1957. 
48. Village Courts Act, ss. 29, 30 ; D.R.C. CHALMERS, supra, note 38, p. 180-84. 
49. L.L. FULLER, supra, note 4, (1963), p. 6-10. 
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custom50, of specific codes of practice51, or of the exigencies of target 
attainment in a planned economy52. Arbitrators are sometimes required to 
formulate decisions in disputes which would not be considered justici-
able. This occurs, for example, when an arbitrator is required to draw up 
the many, detailed, interdependent conditions of service of the employees 
of a large industrial concern53. It may be concluded that to some extent, 
and in some circumstances, different norms are applied by adjudicators 
from those which judges sitting contemporaneously in the same state 
would apply54. 
Mediation and negotiation pose the problem of dispute resolution 
processes which arguably do not entail the application of any norms 
whatever. For a resolution by either of these modes the consent of the 
disputants is necessary. If necessary, it could also be sufficient : the 
parties, it can be argued, are free to agree on any terms at will, and this 
degree of discretion excludes the governance of norms. 
This possibility is not, however, found to be effectuated in the cases 
of mediation and negotiation which have been studied. Thus Gulliver, 
who once argued for a non-normative view of negotiation, later modified 
his view. He arrived at the conclusion, after long observation, that 
mediators and negotiators did seek out and express an overarching rule 
which could be said indisputably to apply to both parties. Such a rule, by 
providing an accepted framework for the dispute, could be the basis for a 
positive phase leading to agreement on a resolution. Although "in 
adjudication there [was] a greater inhibition by norms and rules"55, norms 
were referred to in virtually every negotiation56. 
50. ANONYMOUS, "Note. Predictability of Results in Commercial Arbitration", (1948) 
61 Harv. L. Rev. "The Predictability of Nonlegalistic Adjudication", (1972) 6 Law & 
Soc. Rev. 563. 
51. R. THOMAS, supra, note 16. 
52. J.A. SPANOGLE and T.M. BARANSKI, "Chinese Commercial Dispute Resolution 
Methods : The State Commercial and Industrial Administrative Bureau", (1987) 35 Am. 
J. Comp. L. 761, describing a transition from dispute resolution by administrators 
according to such norms to resolution by arbitrators according to "strict law". 
53. L.L. FULLER, supra, note 4 (1963). 
54. See also: D. RHIDIAN THOMAS, "Commercial Arbitration — Justice According to 
Law", (1983) 2 Civ. Just. Q. 166 ; F.A. MANN, "Private Arbitration and Public Policy", 
(1985) 4 Civ. Just. Q. 257. 
55. P.H. GULLIVER, supra, note 25, p. 683. 
56. P.H. GULLIVER, supra, note 7, (1963), (1969) p. 17-21; Id., "Dispute Settlement 
Without Courts : The Ndendeuli of Southern Tanzania", in R.L. NADER, supra, note 7, 
p. 24 ; Id., supra, note 25 ; see also the critical discussion of Gulliver on this issue in : 
M. SALTMAN, supra, note 7, p. 45-46 ; M.A. EISENBERG, supra, note 4, p. 640-42. 
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Furthermore, it may be contended that, even if there are disputes in 
which no party at any stage overtly cites a norm, the external boundaries 
of any dispute in society are set by norms. A decision, whether by 
agreement or by imposition, which would contradict any norm which is 
accepted in the social field to which the disputants belong, is not usually a 
possible resolution of a dispute. No doubt further constraints are imposed 
in some instances by facts such as the power of one of the disputants. But 
the exercise of power occurs within the normative frame within which the 
dispute is fought and resolved. It may be a rule in a society — it is 
probably a rule in many societies — that disputes are not to be settled in 
zero-sum manner, and that if a strict application of legal norms would 
have this result, then the norms must not be strictly applied57. But this 
very approach is embodied in a normative principle, and in so far as it is 
considered binding on all parties to disputes it may be characterised as no 
more than an overriding legal norm. There are, therefore, strong grounds 
for concluding that legal norms play a part in most dispute resolution 
processes, including not only adjudication by state courts but all other 
modes, including those where the outcome is not determined by a third 
party58. 
If all instances of mediation and negotiation are constrained by legal 
norms which are effective in a social field of the parties, instances which 
are established under the authority of state law are constrained within a 
framework of state law norms. Thus both mediation and negotiation must 
be conducted with regard to the laws of state courts if there is a desire that 
the final settlement should be enforceable or recognisable there. In a 
common law jurisdiction disputants will, for example, need to avoid 
committing provable misrepresentation, as it is understood by the law of 
the state courts, although they need not avoid puffing. A party may find it 
wise to require the other to put his or her representations, made in the 
course of a dispute settlement process, in writing, so that if they prove 
false they may be proved and a remedy obtained in a state court. It has 
been said that the law of contract and tort generally govern negotiation, 
with divorce and labour law also applying in relevant cases59. 
How far is the law which is applied in state mediation and negotiation 
the same law as that applied in state adjudication ? The body of norms 
57. L. NADER, "Styles of Court Procedure: to Make the Balance", in L. NADER (ed.), 
supra, note 7, p. 69. 
58. R.L. ABEL, supra, note 3, p. 236-39 ; see also A.S. MORRISON, "IS Divorce Mediation 
the Practice of Law? A Matter of Perspective", (1987) 75 Calif. L. Rev. 1093. 
59. E.H. NORTON, supra, note 22. See also R.H.MNOOKIN and L. KORNHAUSER, supra, 
note 23. 
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applied in mediation and negotiation does not include all those which 
would govern in adjudication. Consequently, although the resolution 
reached through mediation or negotiation is ordinarily enforceable in a 
state court, it can differ from the resolution which would have been 
reached by that court. Further, there is evidence that in negotiation the 
parties are likely to observe a combination of state laws and non-state 
laws60. Therefore, in so far as identifiably state-law norms are observed, 
their character is likely to be changed by the simultaneous adherence to 
non-state laws. This will be further developed when mediation and 
negotiation outside the purview of the state are considered. 
2.3. Dispute resolution in non-state laws 
The conclusions to be drawn here largely follow from arguments 
already presented, although they could be established independently on 
the evidence. It has been argued that there exist alternative bodies of law, 
in the sense of non-state, customary laws. It has been argued that there 
exist alternative dispute resolution processes in the sense of processes 
established and governed by customary laws. It has been argued that not 
only adjudication, but also arbitration, mediation and negotiation involve 
the application of legal norms ; and that, as between different state-law 
modes and forms, the contents of the applied laws differ. It follows that 
each non-state dispute resolution process involves the application of a 
particular body of non-state law. 
There are numerous examples of adjudication by judges owing their 
authority to customary laws, and in which resolutions are reached by the 
strict application of customary law61. Perhaps more numerous are 
instances of arbitration, since this does not require the existence of a 
permanent office-holder. However, if the disputants are able to exercise a 
degree of choice in selecting the third party, they are likely also to be able 
to ask that that party mediate rather than giving a determinative decision, 
unless the governing customary law precludes mediation. Thus it has 
been shown that, in the law of a certain New York Jewish community, 
some disputes must be determined by the application of strict rules, but 
for others the disputants are asked to choose between din ("strict law") 
60. T. THOMAS, supra, note 16. Cf. R. YOUNG, supra, note 19, p. 326-27, concluding that 
the absence of commonly accepted norms was one of the causes of the relative failure of 
a state mediation scheme. 
61. See e.g.: ANONYMOUS, supra, note 36; H.J. KIRSCH, supra, note 36; B. de SOUSA 
SANTOS, supra, note 34; C.P. DREDGE, supra, note 34; L. POSPISIL, "Modern and 
Traditional Administration of Justice in New Guinea", (1981) 19 Journal of Legal 
Pluralism and Unofficial Law 93; BAXI, supra, note 36. 
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or pesharah (comprise, i.e. mediation), and nearly always choose the 
latter62. Mediation nevertheless does entail the application of norms63, as 
does negotiation64. 
Frequently the disputes submitted to non-state resolution processes 
could alternatively have been taken to state processes. The resolutions 
which emerge from the application of customary laws are different from 
those which would emerge from the application, in corresponding 
processes, of state laws. That conclusion may be challenged in respect of 
some instances. It sometimes appears, and is claimed, that customary 
laws are identical with state laws. The state legal system may, for 
example, expressly provide for the "recognition" or "incorporation" of 
customary laws into state law. That such claims to identity of content are 
usually false is shown by the experience of attempts to apply customary 
laws in state processes. These have been shown to result in the 
transformation of the norms applied. For example, in relation to the 
Village Courts of Papua New Guinea, Paliwala has shown that the 
realities of state power and economic changes resulted in the Village 
Courts in practice applying a body of norms different from those of the 
practised customary laws, and becoming adjudicatory rather than 
62. ANONYMOUS, supra, note 36; H.J. KIRSCH, supra, note 36. 
63. P.H. GULLIVER, supra, note 7 (1963); A.L. EPSTEIN (ed.), supra, note 3 ; A.L. 
EPSTEIN, supra, note 3, p. 21 ; M. SALTMAN, supra, note 21 ; C.P. DREDGE, supra, 
note 34; P. FITZPATRICK, supra, note 3, p. 234-38. 
64. P.H. GULLIVER, supra, note 7 (1963) ; Id., supra, note 7 (1969) ; Id., supra, note 56 ; Id., 
supra, note 25; A.L. EPSTEIN, supra, note 3 ; M.A. EINSENBERG, supra, note 4 ; 
C.P. DREDGE, supra, note 34. In the course of his detailed and subtle discussion 
Eisenberg advances two arguments which need attention in the development of a theory 
which views laws as consisting of bodies of social norms. (1) He argues that western 
jurisprudence fails to see the full range of legal norms in status-oriented societies, and so 
fails to appreciate that norms are being taken into account when status relations affect 
negotiating positions in such societies. (2) He argues that in all negotiation, even in 
industrialised western societies, "the universe and operation of norms is open-ended", 
that is, all applicable norms are taken into account, even if they "collide" (partially 
conflict) or are "legally invalid" (inapplicable in adjudication). (See M.A. EISENBERG, 
supra, note 4, p. 642-45). These observations illuminate a notion recently developed by 
Chiba. He argues that, whereas in western societies the motivating attitude to legal 
rights is "definite" (strict), in Africa it is "elastic". He relates the latter particularly to 
the importance of status roles, which he characterises as a "functional complement" to 
law in African societies. In passing he wonders whether the Western approach is as 
definite as it has been represented, and whether there might be a Western functional 
complement in terms of "the freedom of each party to resort to or waive his or her 
rights". (See M. CHIBA, supra, note 1, especially p. 149, n. 3 ; discussed further 
G.R. WOODMAN, Book Review, (1990) 29 Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial 
Law forthcoming.) Perhaps Chiba's functional complements are not unrelated to 
Eisenberg's norms which affect negotiation but are ignored in adjudication. 
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mediatory institutions65. It has been observed that in consequence the 
genuinely indigenous dispute resolution processes continue outside the 
aegis of the state, while the village courts constitute an "alternative [sic] 
forum" to these, rather than a substitute for them66. Similarly it has been 
argued that the enforcement of "customary laws" in regular state courts 
in African countries has resulted in the creation of new bodies of 
' 'lawyers' customary laws". These laws owe much of their content to the 
previous, practised customary laws, but some vital features also to the 
characteristic procedures and remedies of the state courts67. 
This account confirms a conclusion which has sometimes been drawn 
from the study of state courts over time, concerning the interaction 
between dispute resolution processes and the content of legal norms. The 
processes in any social field (including the state) are an integral part of the 
implementation of the body of law of that social field. But although the 
processes are often viewed as having been established by legal norms, 
and as being continuously legitimated by legal norms, it seems that they 
react upon the content of that body of norms. Consequently the legal 
norms are formed in part by the requirements and limitations of the 
procedures and remedies of the processes. This is true not only of state 
law and dispute resolution processes, but of the law and dispute 
resolution processes of other social fields. 
It has been argued that the requirements and limitations of the 
standard case of state law adjudication differ from those of alternative 
modes and forms of dispute resolution. Alternative processes of dispute 
resolution therefore entail alternative bodies of substantive law. Thus 
alternative dispute resolution is intertwined with legal pluralism. 
3. Implications 
3.1. Social 
The differences between the substantive laws of the various state and 
non-state dispute resolution processes result in a different pattern of 
outcomes for each process. It seems reasonable to propose the hypothesis 
that different processes may be found systematically to favour the 
interests of different social categories. This is a field in which relatively 
65. A. PALIWALA, "Law and Order in the Village: The Village Courts", in D. WEISBROT, 
A. PALIWALA and A. SAWYERR (eds.), supra, note 38, p. 191 ; Id., "Law and Order in 
the Village : Papua New Guinea's Village Courts", in C. SUMNER, supra, note 3, p. 192. 
66. P. FITZPATRICK, supra, note 3, p. 246, 247. 
67. G.R. WOODMAN, " H O W State Courts Create Customary Law in Ghana and Nigeria", in 
B.W. MORSE and G.R. WOODMAN, supra, note 34, p. 181. 
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little investigation has been completed. Much of that which is available 
has been done for the purpose of evaluative discussion. Consequently 
only a few miscellaneous comments will be made here. The question will 
be central to the next section. 
It seems to be established that the categories benefited by a newly 
developed process are not always those which were predicted to benefit 
by those who set up the process. Thus small claims procedures have often 
been promoted on the ground that they would assist individuals with few 
resources to assert their rights against larger opponents. But it has been 
repeatedly found that on the whole small claims procedures have tended 
to be used primarily by businesses against individuals68. Again, there is 
evidence that in Africa those particular dispute resolution processes set 
up or "recognised" by the state to apply customary laws have tended to 
enhance the dominance of males, the old, and those with high traditional 
status69. 
It is to be expected that the social functions of dispute resolution 
processes may be traced in the first instance by investigating the modes 
and forms of production out of which legal institutions arise. The basis of 
most particular bodies of law can be found in specific instances of modes 
of production, the social relations within which are both reflected and 
maintained by the application of legal norms. It is a reasonable hypothesis 
that a body of law or a category of dispute resolution process will benefit 
the class which is formed by and dominant in the relations of production 
with which the law or process is associated. 
In modern industrialised, western states, the modes of production are 
relatively homogeneous. In so far as customary laws arise directly from 
relations of production or exchange, these norms and the dispute 
resolution processes which apply them tend to maintain those relations 
and the dominance of particular interests within them. Frequently, 
however, the social fields of non-state laws are particular classes or sub-
classes, such as wage-labour, or the practitioners of a particular 
profession. In any such case the laws and their dispute resolution 
processes may produce solidarity within the field against hostile external 
groups, but are likely within the field to favour a varied set of interest 
groups. 
68. B. YNGVESSON and M. HENNESSEY, supra, note 18. 
69. M. CHANOCK, "Neo-traditionalism and the Customary Law in Malawi", (1978) 16 
African Law Studies 80 ; Id., "Making Customary Law : Men, Women and Courts in 
Colonial Northern Rhodesia", in M.J. HAY and M. WRIGHT (eds.), African Women and 
the Law : Historical Perspectives, VII, Boston University Papers on Africa, 1982 p. 53 ; 
Id., Law, Custom and Social Order: the Colonial Experience in Malawi and Zambia, 
Cambridge, Cambridge U.P.,1985. 
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The homogeneity of production processes means that it is likely to be 
difficult to introduce new dispute resolution processes alternative to state 
adjudication in modern western societies. A significant number of 
disputes here arise between persons whose sole field of common 
membership is that of state law. Many accept the norms of state law only 
when they are coercively applied. When such disputes between such 
parties cannot be resolved by state adjudication, there may be no means 
of resolving them70. 
For certain third-world countries it has been argued that traditional 
customary laws arise from a distinct mode of production which is clearly 
distinguishable from, although articulated with, the capitalist mode which 
has given rise to state laws. If this were the case, one would expect quite 
different but identifiable interest groups to be benefited by the different 
laws and their dispute resolution processes. However, it is difficult to 
distinguish in any of these countries two relatively uniform modes of 
production as distinctly as the hypothesis supposes. One can identify a 
number of modes and forms of production which are deeply interdepen-
dent at any moment, even though this interdependence may not be 
necessary to the reproduction of any. The study of customary laws and 
modes of production in third-world countries suggests that no simple, 
general account of these differences is possible. 
3.2. Evaluative 
Value judgments of particular acts or practices depend, of course, on 
the underlying value premises of the critic. It may suffice to note here the 
value-discussion of alternative dispute resolution and non-state law which 
has developed in the past decade or so. 
The possible social changes which might be effected through state 
introduction, fostering and control of alternative dispute resolution 
processes was a new topic of concern to law and society theorists in the 
late seventies. Initially enthusiastic arguments were advanced for the 
view that, at least in western societies, the promotion by the state of 
alternative dispute resolution was a liberalising, progressive phenome-
non. An example is the progress of the Florence Access-to-Justice 
70. L. NADER, "Disputing Without the Force of Law", (1979) 88 Yale L.J. 998 ; R. YOUNG, 
supra, note 19. 
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project71. This favourable view has been widely rejected as a result of 
empirical research and critical analysis of the theoretical arguments72. 
The advancement of alternative dispute resolution has been criticised 
first on the basis of the values of the liberal democratic state. It has been 
argued that adjudication has the merit that it enables state courts to "right 
wrongs" as determined in accordance with democratically accepted 
values. Thus one powerful critic of alternative dispute resolution has 
asserted that "civil litigation is an institutional arrangement for using state 
power to bring a recalcitrant reality closer to our chosen ideals"73. If this 
is so, then to replace adjudication by other dispute resolution processes is 
to substitute processes which result in compromises in favour of power74. 
It might perhaps be replied that the state courts have generally claimed an 
overarching, controlling authority which could enable them to impose 
community values on powerful interests even when those interests are at 
an advantage. However, it was seen above that the norms given practical 
effect in other modes of dispute resolution tend, notwithstanding the 
supervisory control of state courts, to differ from those implemented in 
adjudication. This is essentially the argument which has been relied upon 
by these critics of alternative dispute resolution. They have claimed that 
the opportunities for control, and the enforcement of conciously accepted 
community values, by state courts are more limited when consensual 
dispute settlements are reached, perhaps as a result of pressure in the 
process of mediation or negotiation, than in adjudication subject to appeal 
or review75. However, in so far as critics claim that alternative dispute 
71. See M. CAPPELLETTI (Gen. Ed.), supra, note 14. The initiation of the alternative dispute 
resolution movement in the USA has been identified as the Pound Revisited Conference 
at St. Paul Minnesota in 1976 : L. NADER, "The ADR Explosion — the Implications of 
Rhetoric in Legal Reform", (1988) Windsor Y.B. Access Justice 269, p. 271-75. 
72. See the discussion and literature cited infra. Notable statements of viewpoints opposed 
to the advance of alternative dispute resolution are : R.L. ABEL, "Conservative Conflict 
and the Reproduction of Capitalism: the Role of Informal Justice", (1981) 9 
International J. of the Sociology of Law 245 ; Id., supra, note 7 ; L. NADER, supra, 
note 71. Similar criticisms appear to be endorsed by J.S. AUERBACH, supra, note 35, 
especially p. 144. However, the analysis presented in that work is concerned only with 
dispute processes, not norms, and is committed to a legal centralist view. It needs to be 
added that the Florence Project was sufficiently balanced and scientific not to emerge 
with unqualified support for alternative dispute resolution. 
73. O.M. Fiss, "Against Settlement", (1984) 93 Yale L.J. 1073, p. 1089. 
74. O.M. Fiss, supra, note 73, p. 1085-87. 
75. O.M. Fiss, supra, note 73, p. 1083-84. For a detailed reply to Fiss, see J.K. LIEBERMAN 
and J.F. HENRY, "Lessons from the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement", (1986) 
53 U. Chic. L. Rev. 324. Their discussion starts from a description of the notion of 
alternative dispute resolution framed in terms of approved aims, and so heavily value-
laden. 
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resolution is inimical to the rule of law, their analysis may be questioned. 
The argument of the present paper implies that these processes are 
inimical to the rule of the law of state adjudication, but are in accord with 
the rule of other laws76. 
Secondly, some critics, whether committed to liberal democratic 
values or not, have focused on the interests which alternative dispute 
resolution favours and the attitudes to which gives effect. It has been 
argued that it tends to increase the disadvantages of already disadvan-
taged groups, and also to provide more openings for the influence of 
social prejudices77. As a subsidiary argument it is also claimed by some 
that, in addition to the direct conferment of advantages on a class basis, it 
performs the ideological functions of concealing the realities of class 
domination, and dividing an oppressed class78. 
These criticisms generally compare alternative dispute resolution 
processes with adjudication in the regular state courts. Some of the 
critics, while not greatly approving of the results produced by the latter, 
are seeking to warn that (from some bases of judgement) other state 
processes may be still less desirable. However, there are many categories 
of disputes for which adjudication in regular state courts is not likely to be 
accessible in prevailing social and political circumstances. In these cases, 
the alternative process is "alternative" not to adjudication, but to 
coercion by the stronger party. For the weaker party in such a dispute, a 
process of mediation, or even negotiation, if it opens the situation to the 
view of the public or a mediator, and thereby makes room for social 
norms to operate, may be preferable79. 
The debate on these issues has been conducted almost entirely in 
relation to the various modes of state dispute resolution. The criticisms 
have been directed against processes which have been established by the 
state. "The state" in this case means the social groups which dominate, 
76. See L. NADER, supra, note 71, p. 275, 287. 
77. K. ECONOMIDES, "Small Claims and Procedural Justice" (1980) 7 British J.L. & Soc. 
I l l ; R.L. ABEL, supra, note 72; Id., supra, note 11 ; Id., "The Contradictions of 
Informal Justice", in Id. (ed.), 7, Vol. 1, p. 267;S.E. MERRY, supra, note 21, p. 32,39; 
R. DELGADO et al., "Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in 
Alternative Dispute Resolution", (1985) Wis L. Rev. 1359; M.J. BAILEY, "Unpacking 
the 'Rational Alternative1 : a Critical Review of Family Mediation Movement Claims", 
(1989) 8 Can. J. Farn. L. 61 ; E.H. NORTON, supra, note 22 ; DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW 
REVIEW, Quality of Dispute Resolution Symposium, (1989) 66 Denver U.L.R. (n° 3). 
78. R.L. ABEL, supra, note 72, p. 261 ; L. NADER, supra, note 71, suggesting at p. 286 that 
there are involved government strategies of pacification analogous to the British 
colonial policy of Indirect Rule. 
79. See especially the instances discussed in L. NADER, supra, note 36. 
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or at least have the capacity to set in motion the state apparatus. These 
forms of alternative dispute resolution have been promoted on the ground 
that they have been designed for the use and benefit of underprivileged 
social groups, which by definition are groups other than those who 
establish and control the processes. It is not altogether surprising that 
state alternative dispute resolution processes do not liberate the under-
privileged groups. 
The limited scope of the debate has been noted by Galanter, who 
claims that "far more disputing is conducted within... indigenous 
[i.e. non-state] forums than in all the free-standing and court-annexed 
institutions staffed by arbitrators, mediators and other ADR profes-
sionals"80. 
The social functions of alternative dispute resolution may be different 
in the cases of processes established not by the state, but by social groups 
of limited extent for the use of their own members. These may well apply 
norms which favour certain sections of the group. But for groups of 
limited extent, their relationship as a collectivity with the outside world is 
important. The operation of dispute resolution processes within the group 
tend to enhance the group's autonomy at least in the negative sense that 
outside forces have less occasion to direct the conduct and relations of 
members. More positively, they may reduce conflict within the group, 
thus enabling members to benefit by acting with unity towards the outside 
world. Finally, the politically radical critics do not exclude the possibility 
that alternative dispute resolution processes may at certain historical 
junctures be effectively used to advance progressive revolutionary 
movements81. 
Outside the industrialised west value-debates have centred on the 
merits and demerits of indigenous customary laws and their related 
dispute resolution processes. The basic issues here concern the de-
sirability or otherwise of fostering, continuing, modifying or suppressing 
aspects of earlier, indigenous cultures in social circumstances transfor-
med by the impact of international capital. These debates turn on the 
broadest issues of political economy, to which issues concerning 
alternative dispute resolution are subordinate. 
80. M. GALANTER, "Introduction. Compared to What? Assessing the Quality of Dispute 
Processing", in Quality of Dispute Resolution Symposium, loc. cit., supra, n. 77, p. xi, 
at p. xiii. 
81. R.L. ABEL, supra, note 11, p. 11-12. A possibly more pessimistic view of the prospects 
is put by B. de SOUSA SANTOS, supra, note 34. 
